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[So F. No. 18117. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.]

HERBERT BECK, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, V.
WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et a1.,
lWspondents; JETTIE KNOLL, Intervener and Respondent.
[1] Insurance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

Act of Beneficiary.-A beneficiary under a life insurance policy
who murders the insured may neither receive nor retain proceeds of the policy, since it would be unconscionable to allow
him to profit from his own wrong.
Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful Act of
Beneficiary.-Although principal beneficiary who murders insured is disqualified to receive or retain proceeds of insurance,
the insurer is not thereby relieved from liability unless the
policy so provides.
Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Wrongful Acquisition of Property.-Where one has by his own wrong obtained the legal title
to property, a trust as to such property will be imposed on him
in favor of the party injured, this principle being based on the
maxim that no one may profit by his own wrong. (See Civ.
Code, §§ 2224, 3517.)
Insurance-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-E:lfect of Wrongful
Act of Beneficiary.-Where the primary beneficiary of an insurance poliey murders the insured, all doubts as to who would
have received the proceeds but for the murder must be resolved against the murderer.
Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Construction of PoliCJ'.Because the beneficiary clause of a life insurance policy in
which the insured has reserved the right to change beneficiaries is donative and testamentary in character, the intent
of the insured .as expressed by the language which she used
should be given effect so far as possible.
Id.-Proceeds and Beneficiaries-Effect of Wrongful Act of
Beneficiary.-Where life insurance policy designates insured's
husband as primary beneficiary "if living," otherwise to a
named alternative beneficiary, and husband by reason of his
murder of the insured cannot receive the proceeds of the

[1] Murder or killing of insured by beneficiary or by a third
person who procures the policy as affecting life insurance or its
proceeds, notes, 70 A.L.R. 1539; 91 A.L.R. 1486. See, also, Cal.Jur.,
Insurance, § 124; Am.Jm., Insurance, § 1310.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,6] Insurance, § 231; [3] Trusts,
§ 137; [5] Insurance, § 219.
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policy. tht' Illtl'rnlltin' I)('nplicilll"~' rather than the insured's
t'~ta te is pntitlpd to 8lwh procp(,ds, since the insured has clearly
indit'll«'d her intcnt that I\n~' interest her estate might have
in the procPt'ds i5hould 1)(' SubOl'dinlltc to the intt>rest of the
nltprnative beneficiary .

•\PPEAL frolll a judg'llll'nt of the Superior Court of the
City ant! Count~· of San Francisco. Daniel R. Shoemaker,
.J udge. Affirmed.

.-

Aetion by adlllinistrator of insured to recover proceeds of
a life policy, ill which alternative beneficiary intervened .
.rudgment on pleadings for intervener as against claims of
original plaintiff, affirmed.
Chas. I. Rosin for Appellant.
Panl Friedman for Intprvener and Respondent.

)

)

TRAYNOR, J.-On May 23, 1946, the West Coast Life
Insurance 'Company issued a life insurance policy to Mrs.
D. A. Downey. The beneficiary clause provided that the
proceeds be paid to "David Albert Downey-Husband, if living, otherwise to Jettie Knoll-Friend of the Insured." The
insured reserved the right to change beneficiaries. On JUly
18. 1!J47. the primary beneficiary murdered the insured in
Colorado. He has been convictrd of the crime and sentenced
to life imprisonment. (Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307
[215 P.2d 892].) Herbert Beck, administrator of Mrs. Downey's estate. brought this action against the insurer to recover the proceeds of the policy. In its answer the insurer
alleged that the cause of death was not within the coverage
of the policy and asked that the policy be cancelled for fraud.
Lt'a,'e was then granted to Jettie Knoll, the alternative beneficiary, to intervene in the action. Beck and Knoll pach
mowd for judgment on the pleadings against each other,
and the trial court granted Knoll's motion and ordered that
the aetion procped with Knoll as sole plaintiff against the
insurer. Reek has appealed from the judgment that he has
no interest in the policy.
[1] Under the terms of the policy the murderer is entitled to the proceeds. but since it would be unconscionable
to allow him to profit from his own wrong, he may neither
rreeiw nor retain them. (Drown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 175 Cal. 21, 23 [165 P. 5] ; West Coast Life Ins.
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Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal.App.2d 771, 773 [138 P.2d 384];
sct', also, eases collected in 91 A.L.R. 1486.) [2] Unless
the policy so pro\'ides, however, the insurer is not relievpd
of liability beeaus(~ of the disqualification of the principal
beneficiary. (Meyer v. Johnson, 115 Cal.App. 646, 650 [2
P.2<1 4:)6 J ; WI'st Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 58 Cal.App.
!!tl 77], 786 [138 1'.2d 384] ; see Vance on Insurance [2d ed.]
p. 599.) It is therefore necessary to tletermine whether the
proceeds should be paid to the named alternative beneficiary
or to the estate of the insured.
The general principle that precludes a wrongdoer from
unjustly enriching himself has been codified in section 22241
and 3517 2 of the Civil Code and applied in a variety of
situations. [3] "[W] here the tlefendant has by his own
wrong obtained the legal title to property; a trust as to
such property will be imposed upon him in favor of the
party injured. This principle is a familiar one and is based
upon the maxim, which has been carried into our code (Civ.
Code, sec. 3517), that no one may profit by his own wrong.
Tht' instances of its application are as various nearly as
the ways in which property can be wrongfully acquired."
(Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 494 (185 P. 174] ; see, also,
Sem's v. Rule, 27 Ca1.2d 131, 139 [163 P.2d 443] ; Weinstein
\'. Moers, 207 Cal. 534, 541-542 [279 P. 444] ; Smith v. Lombard, 201 Cal. 518, 527-528 [258 P. 55] ; Brison v. Brison, 75
Cal. 525, 526-527 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.Rep. 189] ; 11 A.L.R.2d
808; 159 A.L.R. 997; 102 A.L.R. 589.) Once it is determined that the "Tongdoer may not receive or retain the
property, the question arises as to who is the injured party
or "the person who would otherwise have had it"
(Civ.
Code, § 2224.) Frequently the answer is obvious. Thus
ill the Silva ease, where the sole beneficiary under the will
fraudulently prevented the testator from revoking it, it was
clear that the heirs wer(' the injured parties. Again, when
one person com'eys his property to another in reliance on
a fl'audlll!'nt promise to hold it in trust for thp transferor,
the latter is the one who would have had it but for the
fraud. (Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. ;)25 [17 P. 689, 7 Am.St.
H!'p. 189].) [4] The problem is more difficult, however,
1" One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence,
th(' violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some
other and vetter right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing
gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it .• ,
0, 'N 0 one can take advantage of his own wrong.' 1
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when the primary beneficiary of an insurance policy murders the insured. It will ordinarily be impossible to determine who would have received the proceeds but for the
murder. The lllurderrr himself might have received them
through the natural death of the insured. The insured might
have outlived the murderer but not the alternative beneficiary,
or the insured might have changed the beneficiaries altogether.
If the alternative beneficiary were older than both the primary beneficiary and the insured, the probabilities would
favor the heirs or legatees of the insured as those most likely
to take but for the murder. In any event all doubts must
be resolved against the murderer. Whatever the probability that he would have received the proceeds had he not
murdered the insured, he cannot be allowed to insure that
result by his own wrongful conduct. (Cleaver v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1892), 1 Q.B. 147, 160; see 3
Scott on Trusts, § 494.1, p. 2407.)
As between the estate of the insured and the alternative beneficary there are three possible solutions. It has been
held that the absence of any express provision in the policy
permitting the alternative beneficiary to take, when the primary beneficiary is still alive, requires that the proceeds
be paid to the estate of the insured. (Beck v. Downey, 191
F.2d 150, 152.) The choice might also be made on the
basis of mortality tables and the proceeds paid to the person or persons who would be most likely to take had the
murder not been committed. The third solution is to allow
the alternative beneficiary to recover the proceeds. (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F.Supp, 228; Neff v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ohio Common Pleas), '
96 N.E.2d 53, 54-55; United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F.Supp.
847, 854; Sharpless v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United
Workmen, 135 Minn. 35, 37 [159 N.W. 1086, L.R.A. 1917B
670] ; see 3 Scott on Trusts, § 494.1, p. 2407; Costigan, note,
9 Ill.L.Rev. 505, 509; Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 Harv.L.Rev.
715, 742.)
[5] We have concluded that the third solution should
be adopted. Because the beneficiary clause of a life insurance
policy in which the insured has reserved the right to change
beneficiaries is donative and testamentary in character (Grimm
v. Grimm, 26 Ca1.2d 173, 175-176 [157 P.2d 841] ; Landrum
v. Landrum's Admx., 186 Ky. 775, 779 [218 S.W. 274] ; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, 65 [19 Am.
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Rep. 530]), the intent of the insured as expressed by the
language that she used should be given effect so far as possible. (Estate of Lefrane, 38 Ca1.2d 289, 295-296 [239 P.2d
617], and cases cited; see, also, Prob. Code, § 101.) Although her expressed intent that her husband receive the
proceeds cannot be given effect, the policy names the one
she wished to take if her husband could not. It stated that
the proceeds should be paid to the alternative beneficiary,
if the primary beneficiary predeceased the insured. Thus,
in the type of disability that would naturally be anticipated
by the insured, the alternative beneficiary was preferred
over the e&tate of the insured. [6] In this case there occurred the only other possible contingency in which the
primary beneficiary would be under a disability equivalent
to actual death. The insured has clearly indicated her intent that any interest her estate might have in the proceeds of the policy should be subordinate to the interest of
the alternative beneficiary. This intent is recognized by .
a holding that the alternative beneficiary may recover the
proceeds. A holding that the estate of the insured is entitled to the proceeds would not only defeat this intent,
but would also enable the murderer to deprive the alternative
beneficiary of her opportunity' to take in preference to the
estate by foreclosing the possibility that the murderer might
predecease the insured. The rule that prevents his profiting by his own wrong should not be invoked in such a way
as to prejudice the rights of the alternative beneficiary. "In
a word, it appears to me that the crime of one person may
prevent that person from the assertion of what would otherwise be a right, and may accelerate or beneficially affect
the rights of third persons,but can never prejudice or injuriously affect those rights." (Fry, L. J. in Oleaver v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1892), 1 Q.B. 147, 160.)
It is contended, however, that the court may not award
the proceeds to the alternative beneficiary on the theory
of enforcing a constructive trust against the murderer on
the ground that the doctrine of constructive trusts does not
apply to this situation in this state. In the case of intestate
succession there is a specific statutory provision preventing
a convicted murderer from succeeding to any part of the
estate of his victim and providing how the murderer's share
should be distributed. (Prob. Code, § 258.) Although there
is no such specific provision governing the disposition of the
proceeds of life insurance, it may be contended that the pub-
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lie policy expressed in the Probate Code prevents the passage of either equitable or legal title to the murderer. Since
we are 110t here concerned with any possible interest of a
bona fide purchaser for value from the murderer, it is unnecessary to decide whethl.'r or not legal title passed to him.
Even if it is assumed that the legal title did not pass, an
appropriate rule of law must be applied to determine upon
whom it devolved. A refusal to allow the legal title to go
to the murderer under the terms of the policy would present
the same problem as that created by prohibiting him from
taking the equitable title, and accordingly, the same considerations that lead the chancellor to select the alternative
beneficiary as the beneficiary of a constructive trust, would
lead to a rule of law that the legal title devolves upon her.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-The parties agree that there is no ambiguity in the beneficiary clause of the policy which would justify the admission of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of the words used in it. The decisive question, therefore,
is the very narrow one of textual interpretation. In my opinion, Ol~ly by ignoring the clear and unequivocal language of
the policy of insurance lllay the conclusion be reached that
the alternath-e beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds despite
the fact that the contingency conditioning her right has
never occurred.
The decision is placed upon the ground that "the policy
names the one . . . [the insured J wished to take if her husband could not." In effect, the clause "if living" is enlarged
But the provisions of the policy do not express any intent
to mean "if living and not otherwise disqualified to take."
that Jettie Knoll should be the beneficiary if David Downey is
!lisqualified for some reason other than his death. The contract specifically states, as the only contingency upon which
.Jettie Knoll could become entitled to its proceeds, that David
Downey be not living.
"In the construction of a[n] ... instrument, the office
of the judge is simply -to ascertain and declare what is in
terms or in substance contained thereon, 'IIot to insert what
has been omitte.d . .. ."
(Code Civ. Proc .. § 1858 [italics
aoded},) In violation of this salutary rule, on the basis of

)
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conjecture, an omission is supplied which may have been
either accidental or intentional.
Most of the reasoning to support the decision in favor of
the alternative beneficiary is basl'u upon the doctrine of
constructive trusts. The question as to whether the doctrine
is here applicable is not dccided, but upon a theory which
the court refuses to expressly apply, it is determined that
J ettie Knoll is "the person who would otherwise have had"
the property. 'l'his, says the opinion, is one of three possible
solutions to the problem. It is chosen in preference to a
construction that the alternative beneficiary shall take only
when the express condition of her right to do so has been met.
To determine" the person who would otherwise have had"
the property without giving effect to the unambiguous language of the contract is an impossible task. The insured
reserved the right to change the beneficiary. Who can say
what disposition Lila Downey might have made of the proceeds had she lived f She had the unqualified right to name
the payee of the policy by designating the beneficiary. Under
these circumstances, even if the doctrine of constructive
trusts is applicable, the ultimate question is: Who is entitled
to the proceeds under the express terms of the contract?
Sound public policy dictates that a murderer should not .be
permitted to profit from his own wrong. (Drown v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 175 Cal. 21 [165 P. 5] ; see cases
collected in 91 A.L.R. 1486; 70 A.L.R. 1539.) However,
because that rule bars David Downey from receiving the
insurance money, this court is not thereby at liberty to disregard the otherwise valid provisions of the policy.
To reinforce its conclusion. the majority opinion relies
upon a number of cases from other jurisdictions. With one
exception, each of them is distinguishable upon its facts.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F.Supp. 228,
the administrator of the estate of the deceased insured made
no claim upon the proceeds of the policy in which a contingent beneficiary was named. The court was not faced with,
and did not consiller, adverse claims as between the insured's
estate and the contingent beneficiary. The only question
there decided was "whether Beatrice McDavid took the life
of her husband, Israel McDavid, under such circumstances
that she cannot receive the proceeds of these policies as she
otherwise would have done." . (P. 229.)
In United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F.Supp. 847, the mur-

\
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derer was a contingent beneficiary, and the victim the principal beneficiary, of a matured policy of insurance. Of
necessity the court construed a governing federal statute
(38 U.S. C., § 802 [hl ). To determine the rights of the parties, it looked to the legislative purpose to provide assistance
to persons dependent upon the insured. There was no contest between the estate of either the insured or the principal
beneficiary and any contingent beneficiary because the stat- .
ute expressly provided that no installments of insurance i
should be paid to the heirs or legal representatives of the
insured or of any beneficiary. (38 U.S.C., § 802[j].) Sharpless v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, 135
Minn. 35 [159 N.W. 1086, L.R.A. 1917B 670], did not involve
a dispute between the insured's estate and a contingent
beneficiary.
Only Neff v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Ohio
Common Pleas), 96 N.E.2d 53, offers support for the present
decision. The reasoning of that decision, as in the present
one, entirely ignores the unambiguous language of the contract. Certainly the decision of a nisi prius court is not here
controlling.
The majority opinion also cites, but refuses to follow, the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150. (Petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court now pending.)
This is another case which concerns the right to the proceeds
of insurance upon the life of Mrs. Downey. The district court
awarded judgment to the alternative beneficiary in policies
which read: "to David A. Downey, husband, as beneficiary,
if living; otherwise to Jennie B. Downey, mother-in-law, as
contingent beneficiary." The judgment was reversed with
directions to enter one in favor of the administrator of the
estate of the insured.
The majority opinion of this court inaccurately states the
rule of Beck v. Downey to be "that the absence of any express provision in the policy permitting the alternative benefic'iary to take, when the primary beneficiary is still alive,
requires that the proceeds be paid to the estate of the insured." More correctly, the holding is that the contract must
be given effect according to its plain terms which provide
that the contingent beneficiary can take only if the principal
beneficiary is not alive. The court analyzed the rights of the
parties as follows: "The contingency, which was a condition
precedent to Jennie B. Downey's right to the proceeds, was

\
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that David A. Downey be not 'living' at the time of the death
of the insured. In the ordinary meaning of the word' living,'
the contingency conditioning Jennie B. Downey's right to
the fund never occurred. For when Lila L. Downey died . . .,
David A. Downey was 'living.' The public policy that prevented David A. Downey from receiving the proceeds does
not produce the result of vesting the fund in the contingent
beneficiary. . . .
"The words 'if living' must be interpreted in their ordinary
common sense meaning, namely, that the insured intended
the proceeds to go to her mother-in-law, if the beneficiary was
not alive but was 'dead and buried.' Had there been an intent to have the proceeds go to the contingent beneficiary in
the event of any incapacity of the beneficiary, while alive,
to take the proceeds, plain language to that effect could and
certainly would have been used. We think the language of
the policies was clear and unequivocal." (P. 152.)
The language construed in Beck v. Downey, supra, is substantially the same as that here under consideration. The
two cases are identical in all material respects. They concern
the same deceased and the same provision of policies upon her
life. The reasoning of the federal court is equally applicable
to the rights of Beck and Jettie Knoll. Although that court
was not applying California law and its decision is not here
controlling, it is anomalous for the two highest courts in this
jurisdiction to reach opposite conclusions upon the same
facts by applying the same general principles of common law.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court to enter a judgment ordering that
Herbert Beck, administrator, is, as against Jettie Knoll, the
owner of and entitled to the possession of the proceeds of the
life insurance policy; that J ettie Knoll take nothing by her
complaint in intervention; and that the other issues presented by the answer and cross-complaint of West Coast Life
Insurance Company to the complaint of Beck, as administrator, be tried solely between them.
Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 17,
1952. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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